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UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, 
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION, 
Respondent/ Appellant/Cross-Appellee. 
OPENING BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This action comes within the original jurisdiction of this Court under Utah Code 
.; Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 2014). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Roger Bryner sought judicial review of the informal administrative proceeding that 
resulted in the suspension of his driver's license. Instead of holding a trial de novo, the 
district court reviewed whether there was sufficient evidence presented at the 
~ administrative proceeding and if proper notice had been given. The court remanded for a 
new administrative proceeding with instructions that the agency give proper notice and 
consider evidence of the outstanding warrant against Bryner. Did the trial court err in 
reviewing the informal administrative decision instead of conducting a trial de novo as 
required by Utah Code Ann.§ 630-4-402 (West Supp. 2014)? 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW and STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue 
was raised by the Driver License Division (Division) before the trial judge. R. 460-62. 
The trial court's interpretation of a statute is reviewed for correction of error. Black v. 
Black, 2008 UT App 465, ~ 7, 199 P.3d 371. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-402 (West Supp. 2014) Judicial review -- Informal 
adjudicative proceedings 
(l)(a) The district courts have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all final 
agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings, except that the juvenile 
courts have jurisdiction over all state agency actions relating to: 
(i) the removal or placement of children in state custody; 
(ii) the support of children under Subsection (l)(a)(i) as determined 
administratively under Section 78A-6-1106; and 
(iii) substantiated findings of abuse or neglect made by the Division of Child and 
Family Services, after an evidentiary hearing. 
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall be as 
provided in the statute governing the agency or, in the absence of such a venue provision, 
in the county where the petitioner resides or maintains the petitioner's principal place of 
business. 
(2)(a) The petition for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall 
be a complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and shall include: 
(i) the name and mailing address of the party seeking judicial review; 
(ii) the name and mailing address of the respondent agency; 
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(iii) the title and date of the final agency action to be reviewed, together with a 
copy, summary, or brief description of the agency action; 
(iv) identification of the persons who were parties in the informal adjudicative 
proceedings that led to the agency action; 
(v) a copy of the written agency order from the informal proceeding; 
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain 
judicial review; 
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the type and extent of relief requested; and 
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to relief. 
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are governed by 
~ the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(3)(a) The court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of fact and law and 
any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings. 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judicial proceedings under this section. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Roger Bryner filed this petition for judicial review of an informal administrative 
proceeding in which his driver's license was suspended. R. 227-35. 
Instead of holding a trial de novo, the trial judge reviewed the informal 
administrative proceeding. The judge held that he had insufficient information as to what 
evidence was presented in the informal proceeding. R. 5 86-87. The trial judge therefore 
~ remanded this action for the Division to consider further evidence in a new informal 
proceeding. R. 5 87. The trial judge also remanded this action to the Division to give 
3 
Bryner new notice in lieu of the administrative notice the trial judge held to be 
inadequate. R. 586-87. 
The Court rejects the Division's position that the Court should either 
substitute. its own judgment for the Division's exercise of discretion or defer 
to the Division's decision when it is unclear the Division exercised its 
discretion with the actual facts before it. The statute plainly grants the 
Division discretion, but the parties' factual submissions do not indicate that 
the Division even knew of a warrant, as opposed to a citation, being issued 
against Petitioner. In such case, the alternative remedy of remand is 
appropriate. 
After reviewing the briefs and arguments and evidence submitted in 
this proceeding, the Court finds the evidence is insufficient to determine 
whether the Division was notified by a Court of and considered the 
existence of an outstanding warrant against the Petitioner, as required under 
Utah Code§ 53-3-221(3)(a). The submissions of the parties here indicate 
that Petitioner was informed of an outstanding citation, as opposed to the 
existence of a warrant. Properly framing the issue by notice is important for 
two reasons: First, it informs the Petitioner of the actual basis for the 
proposed administrative action, and second, it ensures that the Division 
made its decision based on the actual facts that potentially justify its action. 
R. 586-87. 
The trial court entered its final order on June 18, 2015. R. 585-87. The Division 
timely filed its notice of appeal on June 29, 2015. R. 590-92. Bryner filed a post-
judgment motion on June 30, 2015, R. 595-99, that was denied by the trial court on 
August 13, 2015. R. 640-41. Bryner filed his cross notice of appeal on September 4, 
2015. R. 643. The Division filed its amended notice of appeal on September 9, 2015. R. 
651-52. 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On May 12, 2014, Bryner was found guilty of three infraction charges in Holladay 
Justice Court, case number 131000539. R. 276-77. The Holladay Justice Court later 
affirmed that finding in a subsequent hearing after denying Bryner's motion to arrest 
judgment on June 4, 2012. R. 278-79. Two of the infractions were for traffic violations. 
R. 279. 
On July 30 2014, the Holladay Justice Court issued a warrant for Bryner for his 
failure to appear at the sentencing hearing. R. 285. During that same hearing, the Justice 
~ Court also stated for the record that it would not sentence Bryner until he appeared in 
person. R. 284-85. 1 
That same day, the Justice Court electronically notified the Division concerning 
the failure to appear at the sentencing hearing. R. 515-18. The next day the Division 
issued a notice of suspension that informed Bryner his driving privilege would be 
suspended as of August 21, 2014. R. 508. The notice of suspension also informed 
Bryner that he could avoid the suspension by clearing the underlying issue with the 
,.J Holladay Justice Court. Id. 
The letter also informed Bryner that he could request a hearing ~ith the Division. 
Id. On August 14, 2014, the Division held a hearing regarding Bryner's impending 
1 At the time this matter was heard in the trial court, the warrant was still active 
and had not been recalled by the Justice Court. R. 285-88. 
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suspension. The hearing officer sustained the suspension. R. 510. Bryner's driving 
privileges were suspended on August 21, 2104. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Trial courts review challenged informal administrative proceedings by trial de 
novo. Such trials de novo correct any procedural due process errors that might have 
occurred. In-this action, the trial judge failed to conduct a trial de novo. Instead he 
reviewed the informal record and remanded this matter for the Division to correct a notice 
that was deemed inadequate and to consider further evidence. The trial judge did not 
have the authority to review the informal adjudicative proceeding other than by trial de 
novo. 
. ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED BY NOT HOLDING A TRIAL DE 
NOVO AS REQUIRED BY UTAH LAW 
Bryner had his driver's license suspended by an informal administrative 
proceeding. Bryner filed his petition for judicial review with the trial court. Judicial 
review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is done by trial de novo. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63G4-402(l)(a) (West Supp. 2014) ("The district courts have jurisdiction to review by 
trial de novo all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings"). 
The trial judge erred by not conducting a trial de novo. 
Instead, the trial judge remanded this proceeding to the Division to correct errors 
the trial judge found had occurred in the informal administrative proceeding. The trial 
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judge erroneously performed a review of the administrative proceeding instead of 
~ conducting the requisite trial de novo. 
Section 402 gives the trial court jurisdiction to review informal adjudicative 
proceedings by trial de novo. This requires that "the district court's review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings be accomplished by holding a new trial, not just by reviewing an 
informal record." Cordova v. Blackstock: 861 P.2d 449,451 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In 
Cordova, the district court did not conduct a new trial. Instead, the district court vacated 
the informal adjudicative decision for violating the residuum rule by relying solely on 
inadmissable hearsay. 
This Court reversed, holding that the district court should have held a new trial and 
not reviewed the informal record. Id. The trial judge in this appeal committed the same 
error as did the district court in Cordova. Instead of determining whether Bryner' s 
driver's license should be suspended based on the evidence before him, the trial judge 
remanded the matter for the agency to conduct a new hearing. He did this not because of 
any concern with the evidence before him, but because he was unsure as to what evidence 
~ had been presented at the informal proceeding. R. 586. He did not have jurisdiction to 
review the sufficiency of the evidence presented in the administrative action. It was the 
trial judge's duty, as stated in Cordova, to conduct a trial de novo and decide based on the 
evidence he received. The trial de novo would permit the trial judge to.assure himself 
that there was adequate evidence to support the suspension of Bryner' s driver's license. 
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Trials de novo are meant to correct any deficiencies that "might arise ·by nature of 
the informality of the agency hearing." Id. "A simple examination of the agency's 
informal record by the district court would not provide the opportunity to correct any · 
deficiencies and prejudice as would a trial." Id. The trial judge did not have jurisdiction 
to review alleged procedural errors of the informal proceedings and claims of inadequate 
evidence being presented. Any such errors were to be corrected by conducting a trial de 
novo. 
Another reason for a trial de novo is to prepare an adequate record for further 
judicial review. Id. at 451-52. This Court has noted that informal proceedings are less 
likely to result in an adequate record. Id. at 452. By his actions the trial judge failed to 
provide this Court with an adequate record to consider the merits of the decision to 
suspend Bryner's license. 
Bryner was not prejudiced by any alleged procedural due process errors committed 
in the informal proceeding. The absolute right to a trial de novo before the trial court is 
meant to correct any such errors. Brinkerhoffv. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 590 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990) (allegedly defective notice in the informal proceeding was cured by trial 
de novo in the district court). And yet the trial judge remanded, in part, this matter 
expressly for the Division to correct an allegedly defective notice. R. 5 86-87. The trial 




The Utah Supreme Court has expressly approved of this Court's decisions in 
Cordova and Brinkerhoff. 
Instead, we note with approval and adopt the rule previously used in 
two decisions from the Utah Court of Appeals establishing the right to a 
new trial without deference to the determinations of an informal 
administrative proceeding. This rule guarantees the district court the 
opportunity to correct any deficiencies that may arise because of the 
informal nature of administrative proceedings and provides an adequate 
record for future review. 
Archer v. Bd. of State Lands and Forestry. 907 P.2d 1142, 1144-45 (Utah 1995) (citations 
omitted). 
This Court's recent decision in Christensen v. Rolfe, 2014 UT App 223, 336 P.3d 
40 (informal driver's license proceedings are only reviewed by trial de novo and not by 
review of the administrative proceeding), was also presented to the trial court. R. 460, 
541, 681, 706. Instead of following Christensen, the trial court reviewed the informal 
proceeding rather than conducting a .~rial de novo, as had the courts reversed in 
. . 
Christensen. The trial ~ourt's decision, as the ·decisions of the trial courts in Christensen, 
should be reversed and this matter remanded for a trial de novo. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial judge should have reviewed the challenged informal administrative 
proceeding by trial de novo. Instead, he reviewed the informal proceeding's record and 
remanded for the Division to c·orrect errors perceived by the trial judge. The trial court's 
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decision should be reversed and this case should be remanded to the trial court for trial de 
novo. 
Respectfully submitted this 
;t/ 
/2.. day of November, 2015. 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent/ Appellant 
Cross-Appellee 
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UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
SAFETY, DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION, 
Respondent. 
ORDER [P11apased] 
Case No. 140906147 
Judge Andrew H. Stone 
The Court has made changes to the proposed order submitted by Respondent, after reviewing 
Petitioner's objections. The Court's additions are in bold and the Court's deletions appear as 
strike-th roughs. 
This matter came before the Court in a hearing on May 11, 2015. There were several 
motions pending before the Court, including cross-motions for summary judgment. The Petitioner 
Roger Bryner represented himself and appeared by telephone. The Utah Driver License Division 
("'Division") was represented by Kevin Bolander, Assistant Attorney General. 
The parties briefed, among other arguments, whether the Petitioner's driving privilege may 
00585 
June 18, 2015 02:52 PM 1 of 3 
be suspended pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 53-3-22 I (3 ). The Petitioner argues that during 
the administrative proceedings, the Division did not consider the existence of an outstanding 
warrant against him, giving the Division no authority to suspend his driving privilege because the 
agency decision was based on a different reason for suspension. The Division argues the Court 
cannot review the administrative record of the informal proceeding, but instead should rule based on 
the arguments and evidence the parties submit during de novo review of the final agency action. The 
Division also argues any procedural defects with its administrative proceedings are cured by de 
novo review, therefore the Court may consider argument regarding whether suspension is warranted 
pursuant to Section 53-3-221 (3). 
The Court rejects the Division's position that the Court should either substitute its own 
judgment for tbe Division's exercise of discretion or defer to the Division's decision when it is 
unclear the Division exercised its discretion with the actual facts before it. The statute plainly 
grants the Division discretion, but the parties' factual submissions do not indicate that the 
Division even knew of a warrant, as opposed to a citation, being issued against Petitioner. In 
such case, the alternative remedy of remand is appropriate. 
After reviewing the briefs and arguments and evidence submitted in this proceeding, the 
Comt finds the evidence eoataiRed iR the administrative reeorcl is insufficient to determine whether 
the Division was notified by a Court of and considered the existence of an outstanding warrant 
against the Petitioner, as required under Utah Code§ 53-3-221(3)(a). lnstead of further 
proeeediflgs Vlith this matter Ofl trial de novo, the The submissions of the parties here indicate 
that Petitioner was informed of an outstanding citation, as opposed to the existence of a 
warrant. Properly framing the issue by notice is important for two reasons: First, it informs 
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the Petitioner of the actual basis for the proposed administrative action, and second, it ensures 
that the Division made its decision based on the actual facts that potentially justify its action. 
The Court therefore remands this matter to the Division pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 63G-
4-404(I )(b )(v), and instructs the Division to consider the existence of the outstanding warrant 
against the Petitioner when determining whether to suspend his driving privilege. 
End of Document-Court Approva] Appears at Top of This Page 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 29rd day of May, 2015, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
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Roger Bryner 
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DRIVERS LICENSE DIVISION, 
Defendant. 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LA.KE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RULING 
Case No: 140906147 
Judge: ANDREW H STONE 
Date: August 13, 2015 
Before the Court is Plaintiff Bryner's Motion re Findings of Fact and Law on 
Notification or Warrant by Justice Court and Maintaining Jurisdiction After Remand. 
This is an appeal of a a decision by the Utah Department of Public Safety, Drivers' 
License Division (Division) to suspend Petitioner's driver's license. Petitioner 
failed to appear at a Justice Court proceeding, and a warrant was issued. 
Subsequently, the Division sent him notice of an intent to suspend his driver's license 
due to the existence of a citation. 
On cross-motions for summary judgment, it was undisputed that the notice provided by 
the Division referred to a citation, and likewise undisputed that a warrant, and not a 
citation, was issued by the Justice Court. Based on that the Court remanded the matter 
to the Division to expressly consider the question with regard to the existence of a 
warrant, not as to a citation. See Order dated June 18, 2015, herein. That Order 
contemplates no further action by this Court until the agency completes its action. No 
further findings are necessary. Plaintiff 1 s Motion for Findings,etc. is therefore 
denied. 
Date: 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document 
case 140906147 by the method and on the date specified. 
MAIL: ROGER BRYNER PO BOX 1082 CLEARFIELD 1 UT 84089 
MAIL: KEVIN L BOLANDER 5272 S COLLEGE DR STE 200 MURRAY UT 84123 
08/13/2015 /s/ MICHELLE ADAMS 
Date: 
Printed: 08/13/15 10:41:22 
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